Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a 2×2 Game: The Indifference Equations
This lesson is part of the course
In this lesson
You solve a promo-timing game without a pure equilibrium: each player's mix makes the other indifferent. You compute both probabilities and chart Bramble's two expected payoffs crossing at Alto's equilibrium mix.
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Lessons in this course
- Payoff Matrices & Best Responses: MAX per Column and per Row Locked
- Dominant & Dominated Strategies: Iterated Elimination Step by Step Locked
- Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria: Cells Where Both Play a Best Response Locked
- Prisoner's Dilemma & Repeated Games: Discounting and the Grim-Trigger δ Locked
- Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a 2×2 Game: The Indifference Equations Locked
- Zero-Sum Games & Minimax: Saddle Points and the Value of a Mixed Game Locked
- Sequential Games: Backward Induction and Entry Deterrence Locked
- Auction Basics: First-Price vs Second-Price Revenue (Revenue Equivalence) Locked