Optimal Bid Shading in First-Price Auctions: (n − 1) ÷ n × Value
This lesson is part of the course
In this lesson
You calculate the equilibrium bid for six lots and confirm on a bid grid that (n − 1) ÷ n × value really maximises the expected profit.
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Lessons in this course
- Auction Formats: Who Wins and Who Pays (English, Dutch, First-Price, Vickrey)Free
- Expected Revenue with Uniform Values: Order Statistics Locked
- Optimal Bid Shading in First-Price Auctions: (n − 1) ÷ n × Value Locked
- Revenue Equivalence: First-Price, Second-Price and All-Pay Side by Side Locked
- Reserve Prices: Expected Revenue over Reserve Levels (Chart) Locked
- The Winner's Curse: Common Values and Estimate Errors (Chart) Locked
- Ad Auctions: Generalised Second Price, Quality Score and the Best Position Locked
- Bidding in Procurement (Reverse) Auctions: Margin vs Win Probability Locked